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Dittler Brothers, Incorporated v. Commissioner: The Effect of the New
Internal Revenue Code § 7477 Declaratory Judgment Provision on a
§ 351 Exchange Under § 367.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 significantly changed the section 367
treatment of exchanges and transfers involving foreign corporations.'
Section 367 provides, in part, that in determining the extent of gain for
an exchange described in section 351, a foreign corporation is "not to
be considered as a corporation" unless it establishes to the satisfaction
of the Internal Revenue Service that the exchange is "not in pursuance
of a plan having as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Fed-
eral Income Taxes." 2 As section 351 provides for non-recognition of
gain in connection with the transfer of property to a corporation con-
trolled by the transferor(s) immediately after the exchange, in exchange
for stock or securities in the same corporation, corporate status is essen-
I. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1042, 90 Stat. 1520. The Act made two
significant changes to section 367 transfers beginning after October 9, 1975. Prior to that time the
non-recognition of gain was predicated upon the receipt of a favorable advance ruling from the
Internal Revenue Service with respect to all transfers of property (outbound, inbound, and exclu-
sively foreign) involving foreign corporations. Now there are separate rules for two fundamen-
tally different groups of transactions.
I.R.C. § 367(a)(1) retains the need for a favorable ruling with respect to outbound transactions.
However, the requirement for an advance ruling has been replaced by the requirement that the
application be made as late as 183 days after the beginning of the transfer. See Rev. Proc. 77-5,
1977-1 C.B. 536.
I.R.C. § 367(a)(2) gives authority to the Service to designate by regulation those transactions
where no ruling would be required; that is, where tax avoidance is clearly not in issue or where it
is possible to ascertain a toll charge. The purpose of the toll charge is to neutralize the potential
for tax avoidance. Absent the taxpayer's agreement to pay the specified amount assessed by the
Service, the Service has the right to issue an adverse ruling even though the specific guidelines
have been met. See Temp. Regs. § 7.367(a)-l(b)(5).
I.R.C. § 367(b) eliminates the ruling requirement entirely for all other transfers (repatriating,
inbound, and those exclusively foreign in effect), It gives authority to the Service to promulgate
regulations to determine when a corporation is to be considered a corporation for purposes of
nonrecognition of gain.
2. I.R.C. § 367. For purposes of the Dittler Brothers exchange, the policy justification for
§ 367 is to prevent the taxpayers from expatriating what is or could be domestically generated
income. Prior to the enactment of what is now § 367 of the Code, it was possible for property to
be transferred to foreign corporations without recognition of gain under the exchange and reor-
ganization sections of the then existing Code. By organizing a corporation in a country that im-
posed no tax on the sale of capital assets, by transferring unrealized profits in securities to that
corporation, and by subsequently selling these assets in the foreign country, the entire tax on
capital gain could be avoided. It was for this reason that transactions involving foreign corpora-
tions were withdrawn from the operation of nonrecognition sections, unless the Commissioner
first determined that the transaction was not primarily motivated by a plan to avoid taxes. See
1931-1 C.B. 471.
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tial to the tax-free exchange.3 A failure to satisfy the section 367 re-
quirements results in recognition of gain.4
Prior to the 1976 Act, the taxpayer had no effective way to appeal an
adverse decision to the courts as the statute required the Commis-
sioner's, not the court's, satisfaction that one of the principal purposes
of the exchange was not the avoidance of taxes.5 The Tax Reform Act
of 1976 provides, in the form of declaratory judgment, a remedy for the
taxpayer whose section 367 transfer does not initially qualify for tax
free transfer status.6 As a result, the Tax Court, in a declaratory judg-
ment action, must consider the concept of tax avoidance as applied to a
section 367 transaction. For while the Internal Revenue Service will
continue to make an initial determination as to the tax status of a sec-
tion 367 outbound transfer, it is now possible for the taxpayer to litigate
that determination in the Tax Court when there is an actual contro-
versy as to whether the transaction has as one of its principal purposes
the avoidance of federal income taxes.
In the past, the Internal Revenue Service has based its determination
with respect to the tax status of a section 367 transfer upon guidelines
issued under that section.7 When the taxpayer's plan does not meet the
3. I.R.C. § 351. The basic premise of§ 351 is that the transfer effects a change in form only
and is therefore not an occasion for determining gain or loss on the transferred property.
The three major requirements of § 351 are:
1. That one or more persons transfer "property" to a corporation.
2. That the transfer be solely in exchange for stock or securities in the transferee corpora-
tion.
3. That the transferor(s) be "in control" of the corporation immediately after the exchange.
"Property" includes money (recognizing the cash needs for working capital), as well as
"know-how," marketing information and other intangibles. See Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1
C.B. 133; Rev. Proc. 69-19, 1969-2 C.B. 301.
4. The section requires more than proof of a necessary and legitimate business purpose for a
transfer to a foreign corporation of intangibles ("tainted assets"), which can be and are expected to
be used in connection with a domestic business and which are therefore categorized upon transfer
as an attempt to "farmout" domestically generated income. Under these circumstances there is a
rebuttable presumption that one of the principal purposes for the exchange is tax avoidance. See
generally B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS, 17.40, .41 (4th ed. 1979).
5. Upon failure to obtain a ruling, however, the taxpayer could appeal an assessment of
deficiency against him based on an argument that § 367 did not apply to the transaction. See
Abegg v. Comm'r, 429 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1970).
6. I.R.C. § 7477 provides for the creation of a remedy in the form of a Declaratory Judg-
ment action:
[I]n a case of actual controversy involving a determination by the Secretary that an exchange
described in § 367(a)(1) is in pursuance of a plan having as one of its principal purposes the
avoidance of Federal income taxes, or of the terms and conditions pursuant to which an
exchange described in § 367(a)(1) will be determined not to be in pursuance of a plan having
as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income taxes.
The remedy is also available upon the failure of the Secretary to make a determination.
7. See I.R.C. § 367. See also Rev. Proc. 68-23 § 3.02(1), 1968-3 C.B. 239. The guidelines
described the various attributes necessary for a transaction to ordinarily receive a favorable ruling
when it involves a § 351 exchange. The guidelines are intended to protect the tax interest embod-
ied in § 61 of the Code which defines gross income as "all income from whatever source derived."
2
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criteria for a favorable ruling under the guidelines," it is predictable
that the Service will continue to issue an adverse ruling. Therefore, the
new declaratory judgment code provision is significant in two respects.
When the taxpayer contemplates an exchange, subsequent to an IRS
adverse ruling, yet prior to the consummation of the exchange, the tax-
payer can petition the Tax Court for a declaratory judgment. In effect,
the exchange must be begun but need not be completed in order for the
taxpayer to take advantage of section 7477. The opportunity to secure
a final and binding determination in advance of total commitment
under a section 367 exchange has obvious advantages, especially when
the taxpayer has conditioned transfer of assets upon a favorable out-
come of the litigation.' Should the Service fail to make a determina-
tion within 270 days from the date of the request for a ruling, the
taxpayer is deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies and
may petition the Tax Court.' I In addition, the new code provision pro-
vides the taxpayer with an opportunity to have an initial adverse deter-
mination reversed by the Tax Court subsequent to the consummation
of the exchange.
In Dittler Brothers, Incorporated v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue," the Tax Court had its first opportunity to review the Service's
adverse ruling with respect to an outbound transfer to a foreign corpo-
ration. At the time of the petition Dittler Brothers had completed the
transaction.' 2 The Court agreed with the petitioners, Dittler, that the
avoidance of federal income taxes was not one of the principal pur-
poses for the exchange, thus permitting a non-recognition of gain on
the transfer.'
3
To gain access to major overseas markets, Dittler Brothers, a corpo-
ration engaged in the production and distribution of lottery tickets,
agreed to enter into a series of agreements with Norton & Wright
Group Limited, a British based corporation with a Dutch subsidiary.
The agreements were structured to enable Norton to obtain substantial
tax benefits under British and Dutch law through the use of their Dutch
Netherlands Corporation (hereinafter referred to as NWBV), and
It is only when a legitimate business reason exists for dealing through a foreign corporation that
the Service will surrender full United States tax jurisdiction. See C. Kingson, Section 367" Theory
andPractice, N.Y.U. 37th Inst. on Fed. Tax. Section 22.01-Section 22.02.
8. The guidelines recommend that the property which is transferred to a foreign corporation
be devoted to the active conduct of a trade or business by the transferee corporation. In addition,
"It is contemplated that the transferee foreign corporation . . . will have need for a substantial
investment in fixed assets in such business or will be engaged in the purchase or sale abroad of
manufactured goods." Rev. Proc. 68-23, 1968-1 C.B. 821.
9. 1976-3 C.B. 239 [hereinafter cited as Committee Report].
10. Id.
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through the establishment of a Netherlands Antilles operating com-
pany (hereinafter referred to as OLINV).' 4
Dittler Brothers agreed to transfer cash and property ("know-how"
of their rub-off method for lottery tickets), while Norton agreed to
transfer cash and marketing information. The transfers were made to
Stansfield Security N.V. (hereinafter referred to as SSNV), the holding
company, which in turn transferred the marketing and "know-how"
information and all except a small portion of the cash to OLINV in
return for 100% of the OLINV stock. During the operation of the
agreements, seventy-five percent of the net profits from OLINV (re-
ceived primarily from the work of its independent contractors, Norton
and Dittler) were paid to the holding company, SSNV.' 5 SSNV, in
turn, passed fifty percent of those profits to Norton and Dittler respec-
tively. '
6
Dittler was subject to federal income tax in the United States on its
share of the repatriated earnings, but the twenty-five percent of earned
income retained by OLINV was not subject to tax.' v The Service
viewed the twenty-five percent retention as a potential for tax avoid-
ance since it would result in the accumulation of earnings and profits in
OLINV not subject to federal income taxes. Where the potential tax
avoidance exists, the burden is on the taxpayer to establish that tax
avoidance was not one of the principal purposes for the transaction.' 8
In June 1976, Dittler requested a determination that the transfer of
cash and "know-how" to a foreign corporation in exchange for stock
did not have as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of tax. It
was not until July 1, 1977 that Dittler received its initial adverse rul-
ing.9 Exigent business circumstances forced Dittler to unconditionally
consummate the exchange on July 8, 1977. Dittler appealed the initial




17. I.R.C. § 882(b). In the case of a foreign corporation, gross income includes only (1) gross
income which is derived from sources within the United States and which is not effectively con-
nected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States; (2) gross income which is
effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States. OLINV's
income was not derived from services within the United States or connected with the United
States, and was therefore not subject to United States corporate tax. As the 25% portion of Dit-
tler's earned income was retained by OLINV, and "fed back" into the corporation as working
capital, it did not qualify as dividends for which Dittler would have individual tax liability. The
Service will not, however, surrender its full United States tax jurisdiction unless a legitimate busi-
ness reason exists for dealing through a foreign corporation. Thus earned income retained by a
foreign corporation is subject to United States tax at corporate rates where tax avoidance motives
are present.
18. T. Ct. R. Proc. & P. 217(c)(2)(i).
19. 72 T.C. No. 77 (Aug. 27, 1979).
4
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its final adverse ruling.2"
The grounds for the ruling were two-fold. First, the transfer did not
meet the requirements of section 3.02(1) of Rev. Proc. 68-2321 that the
transferee devote the property transferred to the active conduct of a
trade or business. (OLINV had only one employee whose duties were
largely ministerial). Second, income from the exploitation of Dittler's
manufacturing "know-how" would be diverted to a passive recipient in
a benign foreign tax country (a foreign country with favorable tax
laws), thereby creating the potential for tax avoidance. The Service
concluded that there was a lack of any distinct purpose for the transac-
tion other than tax avoidance. 22 On May 24, 1978, Dittler petitioned
the Tax Court for a declaratory judgment.23
The Tax Court, in reviewing Dittler's position, first determined its
scope of review under section 7477. The court drew a distinction be-
tween section 7477 and other code provisions relating to declaratory
judgments, most significantly pointing out that the scope of review af-
forded under sections 742824 and 747625 are characterized as de novo
determinations, 26 while section 7477, by its language, limits the court to
a redetermination. 27 Thus the function of a section 7477 declaratory
judgment action is to determine whether the Secretary's ruling is rea-
sonable.
After rejecting the broader de novo determination, the court consid-
ered the Service's request for a narrow "arbitrary and capricious" test
and concluded that such a test would essentially negate any advantage
afforded the taxpayer under the new declaratory judgment provision.
In effect the test would grant the Service almost unlimited power sub-
ject only to the most cursory review by the court. The Tax Court in-
stead chose to adopt a "substantial evidence" test as an appropriate
middle ground on which to base its review. As defined by the Supreme
Court, the substantial evidence rule requires "such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."28
The court noted that the rule had been held an appropriate measure of
20. Id.
21. Rev. Proc. 68-23, 1968-1 C.B. 821.
22. 72 T.C. No. 77 (Aug. 27, 1979).
23. Id.
24. I.R.C. § 7428 deals with declaratory judgments relating to the status and classification of
organizations under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Section 501(c)(3) lists organizations exempt from taxation,
which include corporations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
literary, or educational purposes.
25. I.R.C. § 7476.
26. The critical language in each section is "the [court] may make a declaration with respect
to such initial qualification."
27. The scope of the declaration shall be "... whether or not such determination is reason-
able." I.R.C. § 7477(a)(2)(A).
28. Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 620 (1966).
5
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review for administrative findings of fact. 2 9
In determining the tax status of Dittler's overseas transaction, the
Service had measured the facts and circumstances of the transaction
against its section 367 guidelines. The court readily admitted that, were
the guidelines the sole standard, the Secretary's adverse ruling would
have been sustained. The court noted, however, that while providing
some measure of certainty to the treatment of transactions under sec-
tion 367, the pre-1976 amendment guidelines were, under the amend-
ment policy, primarily of value in enabling the taxpayer to determine
his own tax status.3" The taxpayer might determine, for example, that
he falls within the guidelines (to the extent that a request for clearance
may not be necessary); or that the specific facts of the transaction do
require a determination of the amount of tax which must be paid to
protect against tax avoidance.
3 '
The Tax Court, in recognizing the shortcomings of the guidelines
with respect to their determination under section 7477, undertook an
independent review of the facts in the case as measured against the
critical words of the section 367 provision "that such exchange is not in
pursuance of a plan having as one of its principal purposes the avoid-
ance of federal income taxes."132 After rejecting their interpretation of
principal purpose in an analogous provision under section 269,'3 the
29. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); United States v. First City
Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361 (1967).
30. Committee Report, supra note 9.
3 1. The taxpayer may contemplate a third alternative, that of failing to secure a ruling for
purposes of having the Service view the transaction as a recognition event in order to realize losses
on the exchange. Where, for example, the fair market value of the property exchanged is less than
its adjusted basis, it would be to the taxpayer's advantage to utilize its failure to secure a § 367
clearance, technically adverting the non-recognition of the § 351 gain or loss provision, and
thereby realizing a loss on the exchange.
The Service, however, has concluded that § 367 of the Code applies only to those transactions
upon which a gain is realized. Failure to obtain a ruling will not result in a recognition of loss
under the provision of § 351. See Rev. Rul. 67-192, 1967-2 C.B. 140.
Consistent with this approach, the Service has also ruled that a domestic corporation is not
entitled to utilize to its advantage a failure to secure a § 367 clearance to obtain a stepped-up basis
for assets of a foreign corporation acquired in exchange. Its position is unequivocal: The provi-
sions of what is now § 367 "were not intended to afford taxpayers an option to escape the tax
consequences which would follow from that section . . . . Statutory requirements intended solely
for the protection of the government may be invoked only at the instance of the government."
Rev. Rul. 64-177, pt. 1, 1964-1, C.B. 141.
32. I.R.C. § 367.
33. I.R.C. § 269 deals with acquisitions made to evade or avoid income tax. The language of
that section reads: "If any person or persons acquired... control of a corporation, or any corpo-
ration acquired . . . property of another corporation . . . and the principal purpose for which
such acquisition was made is evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax . . . then the Secretary
may disallow such deduction." Section 269 was "designed to put an end promptly to any market
for, or dealings in, interests in corporations or property which have as their objective the reduction
through artifice of the income or excess profits tax liability." H. REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st
Sess. 49 reprinted in 1944 C.B. 901, 938. If the acquisition secures the benefit of a deduction,
credit, or other allowance which the person or corporation would not otherwise enjoy, and the
6
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court adopted the plain meaning of the term "principal purpose" de-
fined in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary as first in rank, authority,
importance or degree.34
The issue then was whether Dittler's exchange of manufacturing
"know-how" and cash was in pursuance of a plan having as one of its
"first in importance" purposes the avoidance of federal income taxes.
Dittler contended there was insubstantial evidence to support an af-
firmative finding on this issue. The court agreed that Dittler's decision
to expand its operation to gain access to foreign markets was for sound
business purposes: it was at Norton's insistence that the joint venture
was located in the Netherlands Antilles based on certain tax advan-
tages which Norton perceived for itself, Dittler controlled neither the
form nor structure of the transaction; evidence in the record established
that OLINV's need for working capital justified its retention of 25% of
the earnings.35
The Tax Court properly concluded that the appropriate scope of re-
view under the new 7477 provision is the substantial evidence rule.
That test, in fact, comes closer to the scope of review under the declara-
tory judgment provisions, sections 7428 and 7476, than the court was
willing to recognize. The distinction between those provisions, which
provide that the court is to review decisions de novo, and the section
7477 provision, which calls only for a redetermination, is one of theo-
retical rather than practical import. Under all three provisions, the tax-
payer must first exhaust all administrative remedies prior to petitioning
for declaratory judgment. As a result, in rendering judgments under
sections 7428 and 7476, the courts have, in the majority of cases, relied
on administrative records to determine whether the Service's ruling was
correct; they have narrowed their scope of review from de novo to a
review based on evidence contained in such records and to whether, in
view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the Service's adverse
ruling should be sustained or reversed.36
principal purpose of the acquisition was to secure such benefit, the deduction, credit, or other
allowance may be disallowed. See Vulcan Materials Co. v. United States, 446 F.2d 690 (1971).
34. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571 (1966).
35. 72 T.C. No. 77 (Aug. 27, 1979).
36. See I.R.C. § 7428, McGovern, The New Declaratory Judgment Provision for § 501(c)(3)
Organizations- How it works, 47 J. TAX. 222 (1977). The author writes in part:
The Tax Court Rules Committee, in commenting on Rule 217, leaves little doubt on the
intended scope of review: ". . . there do not appear to be at this time any circumstances
under which a trial will be held except as to disputed jurisdictional facts or to resolve dis-
agreements between the parties as to the contents of the administrative record. It is expected
that the Court's function will be merely to adjudicate whether the Commissioner's determina-
tion is erroneous . . . upon the basis of the materials contained in the administrative record
upon which the determination of the Commissioner was based."
See, e.g., Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 44 A.F.T.R. 2d 79-5053 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 30, 1979)
(review only of evidence contained in the administrative record.); Houston Lawyer Referral Serv.
v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 570, 573 (1978) (focus of I.R.C. § 7478 is on review of IRS determina-
7
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The Service's argument that the language of section 367 should be
interpreted to afford the Secretary with broad discretionary powers in
making his initial determination and therefore subject to the most lim-
ited review is without merit. Legislative history bears out this conclu-
sion.37 While it is likely that the courts will follow the Dittler precedent
and apply the substantial evidence rule in subsequent cases that they
are asked to review under section 7477, this court has clearly confined
its decision on the issue of scope of review to this particular case. 38
The function of the Tax Court is, therefore, to review whether the
Secretary's determination is reasonable. 39 The reasonableness of an In-
ternal Revenue Service determination, within the confines of the sub-
stantial evidence rule, is to be measured against the substantiality of
evidence which supports the Service's finding.n The evidence will con-
sist of facts and circumstances leading up to and including the transac-
tion as found in the administrative record.4'
As set out in Rule 217(c)(2)(i) Tax Court Rules of Practice, 2 the
taxpayer has the burden of proof as to the facts and circumstances on
which he relies as evidence of the unreasonableness of the Service's
determination. Absent a substantial business purpose and given the re-
sult of income tax avoidance, the court will uphold an adverse determi-
nation that the transaction had as one of its principal purposes the
avoidance of federal income taxes within the meaning of section 367.
In rejecting the section 367 guidelines as the sole standard for deter-
mining the tax status of an exchange or transfer to a foreign corpora-
tion, the Tax Court recognized the obvious-that the guidelines are not
the law. The court also recognized that the guidelines have been criti-
cized as being overly strict and inflexible where mitigating or unusual
circumstances may prevail.43 The court established that it will be in-
cumbent on future courts when dealing with a section 7477 review to
make an independent determination from the facts and circumstances
tion only). See I.R.C. § 7476, ERIS4 - Tax Court Declaratory Judgments, Tax Mgmt. Mem., Jan.
5, 1976. The court's role under § 7476 is limited to a redetermination of the IRS determination as
opposed to a general examination of the plan or trust. The court's decision is made on the basis of
the administrative record and only in rare instances will a party be allowed to introduce new
evidence.
37. Committee Report, supra note 9.
38. The court writes: "We think the substantial evidence rule can be viewed as falling some-
where between the arbitrary and capricious test and a simple redetermination, and that it is the
proper test for us to use in the instant case." (emphasis added). 72 T.C. No. 77 (Aug. 27, 1979).
39. Committee Report, supra note 9.
40. 72 T.C. No. 77 (Aug. 27, 1979).
41. Committee Report, supra note 9.
42. T. Ct. R. Proc. & P. 214(c)(2)(i).
43. Special Committee on Section 367 Policies, Comments on Guidelines for Rulings under
Section 367 Concerning Foreign Corporations.- An Analysis of Reeenue Procedure 68-23, 23 TAX
LAW. 151 (1969).
8
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 1 [1979], Art. 11
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol11/iss1/11
NEW INTERNAL REVENUE CODE EFFECT
of the case as set forth in the administrative record, and to give, on a
case-by-case basis, a more extensive consideration than heretofore to
those situations which fall outside the scope of the guidelines. Such an
independent determination is in keeping with the spirit of the new pro-
vision" as long as the Internal Revenue Service continues to confine its
favorable rulings to those cases falling squarely within the guidelines.
45
The "first in importance" interpretation given to "principal" is
neither significant nor subject to controversy. The court's consideration
of section 26946 with respect to a basis for its interpretation is useful
only as a comparison of the degree of subjective tax avoidance motive
required by each section. Obviously a greater degree of motive is re-
quired in section 269 where the principal purpose for which an acquisi-
tion is made is to avoid tax. The tax avoidance purpose must exceed in
importance any other purpose. As section 367 only requires a showing
that one of the principal purposes for the exchange was tax avoidance,
the court is not dealing with a vertical hierarchy with a tax avoidance
motive at the top, but with a horizontal plane including several "first in
importance" motives, only one of which needs to be tax avoidance.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that section 367 requires considera-
bly more than a showing that the transaction will result in tax avoid-
ance or the potential of tax avoidance. The presence of tax avoidance
motives will not negate an otherwise bona fide transaction.
47
44. Committee Report, supra note 9.
45. See Letter Rul. 7944053 (Aug. 1, 1979). Based on Rev. Rul. 78-201, 1978-1 C.B. 91, in
which a favorable ruling was conditioned upon the transferor's recognizing as gain on the transfer
an amount equal to the sum of the losses previously deducted by the transferree, the Service issued
an adverse ruling on the following set of facts: Corporation B was a subsidiary of Corporation A.,
engaged in the exploration, production, and marketing of oil and gas. Corporation D, a Canadian
Corporation, was owned by C. B purchased C, whose termination of corporate status as a domes-
tic corporation under § 1504(d) is treated as an exchange. Hence, there was a constructive transfer
of Cs interest in D, a foreign corporation, to purchaser B. B's position was that the principal
purpose of the deemed transfer, resulting from the purchase by B of stock in C, was not due to the
nature or value of the assets of D, which were insignificant in comparison to the nature and value
of other assets in C B refused to comply with a condition similar to that imposed in Rev. Rul. 78-
201, 1978-1 C.B. 91 in that the Service required that D's prior losses, deducted when D was
treated as a United States corporation, be restored to taxable income at transfer. It appears that
B's position with regard to the absence of any tax avoidance motive is well-supported. In fact, the
guideline criteria were essentially met. The Service based its decision on the fact that the potential
income from oil and gas production (D is not yet at the producing stage) was not to be included in
the amount of worldwide income of D subject to tax. The toll charge would, in effect, neutralize
this potential for tax avoidance, if tax avoidance was, in fact, one of the principal purposes for the
exchange. Under the Dirier standards, it is entirely possible that the Tax Court would find the
Service's condition unreasonable.
46. I.R.C. § 269; T. Ct. R. Proc. & P. 217(c)(2)(i).
47. In Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934) Justice Learned Hand stated:
"Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to
choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase
one's taxes." See also Atlantic Coast Line v. Phillips, 332 U.S. 168, 172-73 (1947):
As to the astuteness of taxpayers in ordering their affairs so as to minimize taxes, we have said
that 'the very meaning of a line in the law is that you intentionally may go as close to it as you
9
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While it is yet unclear whether the Internal Revenue Service will
relax its standards for issuing a favorable ruling under the 367 Code
provision, it is likely the Service will, in future determinations, include
conditions upon which the Tax Court might rely should that court find
the Service's initial ruling unreasonable. The court held in Dittler
Brothers that, in the absence of prior enumerated conditions specifi-
cally attached to the exchange, the Tax Court would not impose condi-
tions on its own initiative.4" Thus, by rejecting Dittler's offer, as a
condition to a favorable ruling, that it would insure OLINV's annual
distribution of seventy-five percent of its earnings, the Service lost the
opportunity to impose that condition once the Tax Court ruled in Dit-
tler's favor.
In a transaction as proposed by Dittler Brothers, it is possible to in-
clude as taxable gains under section 367 what would otherwise be ex-
cluded under section 351. The effect of section 367 is to prevent tax-
free transfers of property out of the United States unless the taxpayer
first obtains a ruling. The taxpayer who is contemplating an outbound
transfer to a foreign corporation must secure a favorable IRS ruling
that the foreign corporation to which the transfer will be made qualifies
as a corporation within the meaning of section 367. In order to qualify
the taxpayer must show the existence of non-tax motives, while the tax
benefits must be either non-existent, incidental, or so unimportant as to
negate the existence of a principal tax avoidance motive.
As Dittler Brothers received their initial adverse ruling from the IRS
subsequent to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, and that
determination reflected a traditional adherence to the section 367
guidelines, the effect of the Tax Court's reversal of that determination
is significant. Granted the authority under section 7477 to determine
the reasonableness of an adverse ruling, the-Tax Court established a
procedural mechanism and an evidentiary standard which results in a
less arbitrary and ultimately in a more equitable result.
MICHELLE RIPPON
can if you do not pass it.' (Citation omitted) This is so because 'nobody owes any public duty
to pay more than the law demands; taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions.'
48. The remedy created under § 7477(a)(I)(A)(i) is available in cases where the determina-
tion is made by the IRS that an exchange is one in pursuance of a plan with one of the principal
purposes being tax avoidance. The remedy created under § 7477(a)(l)(A)(ii) is one available to
review determinations where terms and conditions are imposed.
Should the court find the determination unreasonable under § 7477(a)(l)(A)(i), it may then
consider whether the terms and conditions set forth by the IRS under § 7477(a)(1)(A)(ii) are rea-
sonable. Where no issue exists under that section, that is, where no conditions have been set forth,
the court's declaration will apply only to the reasonableness of the IRS ruling.
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